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Abstract
This paper calculates di¤erences in welfare costs of nominal rigidities
in large and small EMU countries. I use a two-country DSGE model
characterized by optimizing agents, monopolistic wage and price setting,
distortionary taxes and government debt dynamics. I nd that these costs
are virtually identical for all members of the EMU, and small countries
are not at a disadvantage when it comes to the setting of the common
monetary policy. This conclusion is primarily due to highly correlated
technological processes in Europe, which cause national and Euro-wide
inations to move together. These ndings are robust to the asset market
structure, trade openness, and di¤erent specications of the Taylor rule.
Key words: European monetary union, nominal rigidities, welfare costs
JEL classication: E31, E58, E63, F33.
1 Introduction
The question of whether or not the creation of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) in Europe was a good idea is far from settled. Now that ten years
have passed since the inception of the Euro, and various indicators of Europes
economic activity became available, the attention of many economists has been
focused on analyzing the workings of the EMU. The global nancial crisis of 2008
has forced the economic community to reexamine the costs and benets of having
a single monetary policy in a group of European counties. Do all members of
the EMU receive adequate attention from the European Central Bank (ECB),
or does the monetary policy favor large countries over small? In the latter
case, could alternative scal arrangements be used to better stabilize individual
countries in the presence of various shocks? Going even further, how would the
answers change if small countries retained their monetary independence?
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In this paper, I address these questions within the framework of New Neo-
classical Synthesis, which is characterized by the presence of nominal inertia
and therefore lends itself easily to analyzing the interaction of monetary and
scal policies. In particular, I use a two-country general equilibrium model of a
currency union to study the relationship between country size and its costs of
wage and price rigidities. To the best of my knowledge, very few authors have
done research in this area. Canzoneri et al (2004) use a two-country partial-
equilibrium model calibrated to the EMU to nd that the central bank pays less
attention to small countriesinations. The authors calculate that small EMU
countries incur up to four times higher welfare costs of price and wage rigidities
(around 1.9 percent of consumption) than their large neighbors.
Recent papers that study the EMU in a general equilibrium setup do so
either using a symmetric currency union model, or link country sizes directly to
the size of the home bias in consumer demand function1 . Thus, consumers in a
small country demand a (proportionately) small amount of domestic goods and
a large amount of goods produced abroad. This assumption carries with it two
important implications.
First, as can be seen in Figure 1, while smaller countries do tend to be more
open, their share of trade in GDP is by no means connected to their relative
size in the union, which makes it di¢ cult to justify small home biases in smaller
countries.
Second, equating home bias and country size means that both members of
the currency union have the same composition of their consumption baskets
(e.g., 10 percent of the small country good) and therefore pay the same price
for them. The two CPIs equalize and move in lockstep unless a preference shock
perturbs the home biases themselves. This of course minimizes ination di¤er-
entials (and therefore welfare costs of having the common monetary authority)
in the two countries.
The main contribution of this paper lies in separating country size from
home bias to better understand the impact of various shocks on national in-
ations and on monetary policy responses in a currency union. In addition, I
augment the standard New-Keynesian two-country DSGE model with a more
realistic economic structure by allowing for incomplete international asset mar-
kets, distortionary taxes, labor market rigidities, and non-zero steady state gov-
ernment debt. Within this framework I pose the following two questions: (1)
are the welfare costs of nominal rigidities in the EMU related to country size,
and (2) which feature(s) of the model have the biggest inuence on the di¤er-
ences in these costs across countries. Most recent studies only address one of
these issues; EMU papers generally have a positive focus, while welfare literature
concentrates on the United States.
The nding of this study is that the welfare costs of nominal inertia are very
similar for the EMU countries regardless of their relative size. Productivity
correlations and intra-union trade act as price-correcting mechanisms following
1See, for example, Benigno (2004), Duarte and Wolman (2003), and Ferrero (2005), among
many others.
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Figure 1: Export Shares in the EMU, 2007. Scatter plot of import shares looks
almost identical to this graph. Source: Eurostat.
country-specic shocks and so help to stabilize the monetary union by reducing
national ination di¤erentials and lowering the costs of idiosyncratic distur-
bances. Intuitively, sticky wages and prices slow down the response of marginal
costs to productivity shocks; at the same time, positive correlation of the latter
ensures that when marginal costs begin adjusting, they move in the same di-
rection. Since ination is given by discounted expectations of future marginal
costs, the response of the central bank to the original disturbance turns out to
be appropriate for both countries. This result is robust to di¤erent specications
of international asset markets, monetary policy rule (including the introduction
of independent monetary policy in each country), trade openness, and several
key parameter values.
In should be noted at the outset that New Keynesian models underestimate
the importance of demand shocks in explaining variability of ination (I will
further discuss this issue below). Admittedly, some of the results may be driven
by this problem; therefore, this study should be viewed as the rst step in
analyzing the relationship between country size and its welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the theoretical model is pre-
sented in section 2; section 3 discusses calibration; section 4 presents simulations
results; robustness checks are discussed in section 5; nally, section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
The currency union is composed of two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ).
Both countries are populated by innitely lived households of measure M in
the home country and M in the foreign; there is no migration. Households
consume all varieties of home and foreign goods and have access to international
markets where they can trade a state-contingent nominal bond (this assumption
will be relaxed later). Each country has a measure one of rms that use labor
and capital to produce a continuum of domestic goods, which are then traded
internationally. Firms are monopolistically competitive, and the prices they set
for their products are sticky. Labor and capital are assumed to be country-
specic, and capital investment is subject to adjustment costs.
I model each country as having only the traded goods sector. Empirical stud-
ies provide mixed evidence on the relative importance of traded and non-traded
goods sectors in generating the observed cross-country ination di¤erentials2 .
Therefore, for modeling simplicity, I assume that all goods are traded.
2.1 Firms
Each country has a continuum of rms indexed by f on the unit interval. At
time t, each home rm rents capital Kt 1(f) from the domestic households at
the rate Rt, hires a labor bundle Nt(f) at the rate Wt and produces one of
the varieties of the domestic good. Each rm is free to set its own price level
PH;t(f) (PF;t(f) in the foreign country). The Law of One Price holds, so every
product sells from the same price at home and abroad.
As a matter of notation, subscripts H and F will refer to a goods country
of origin; asterisks will indicate that it is consumed in country F . For example,
CH denotes consumption of country Hs good in country F . The two economies
have a similar structure; therefore, most of the equations will be presented only
for the home country.
Home rms use the following CRS technology to produce output:
YH;t(f) = ZtKt 1(f)Nt(f)1  ;
where 0 <  < 1, and Zt denotes the level of productivity enjoyed by all the
home rms at time t. Productivity in the two countries evolves according to the
following autoregressive process:
Zt
Zt

=

A11 A12
A21 A22
 
Zt 1
Zt 1

+

"z;t
"z;t

;
and "s arent serially correlated. I abstract from long-term trends in produc-
tivity processes, since the focus of this work is on business cycle uctuations.
2Altissimo et al (2005) present evidence that ination dispersion in the EMU stems primar-
ily from the non-traded goods sectors; on the other hand, Andrés et al (2006) nd that there
is a lower but still persistent ination dispersion in the industrial goods (excluding energy).
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All goods varieties are then bundled into a composite home and foreign goods
using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
YH;t =
Z 1
0
YH;t(f)
 1
 df
 
 1
; YF;t =
Z 1
0
YF;t(f)
 1
 df
 
 1
; (1)
with  > 1. These composite goods can then be used for public and private con-
sumption or private investment; the corresponding demand for rm fs product
depends on its price relative to the average3 :
Y dH;t(f) =

PH;t(f)
PH;t
 
YH;t Y
d
F;t(f) =

PF;t(f)
PF;t
 
YF;t
As in Calvo (1983), home and foreign rms reset their prices each period
with a constant probability (1   ) and (1   ), respectively; otherwise, the
old prices remain in e¤ect. If a (home) rm f gets to announce a new price in
period t, it chooses ~PH;t(f) to maximize its expected future prots
Et
1X
j=t

t;j
j t
h
~PH;t(f)Y
d
H;j(f)  TCH;j(Y dH;j(f))
i

t;j is the home householdsstochastic discount factor: 
t;j = 
j t(jt ), where
t is the marginal utility of nominal wealth (dened in the next subsection).
The optimal price and marginal costs are given by
~PH;t =

   1
Et
P1
j=t ()
j t
jP

H;jYH;jMCj
Et
P1
j=t ()
j t
jPH;jYH;j
(2)
MCt =
RtW
1 
t
Zt(1  )1 
Given the price-setting behavior of individual rms, the aggregate price level
in the country can be written as
P 1 H;t = (1  ) ~P 1 H;t + P 1 H;t 1 (3)
2.2 Households
There is a continuum of households in the home country, indexed by i on the
interval [0;M ]. A representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility
Ut(h) = Et
1X
j=t
j t

Cj(h)
1 
1    (1 + )
 1Lj(h)1+

(4)
3 Imposing the zero-prot condition, the prices (in the common currency) of the bundles
are given by PH;t =
hR 1
0 PH;t(f)
1 df
i 1
1  and PF;t =
hR 1
0 PF;t(f)
1 df
i 1
1  .
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Here Ct(h) denotes the households consumption of the composite good, which
is aggregated from home and foreign goods using the CES aggregator:
Ct(h) =


1

t CH;t(h)
 1
 + (1  t)
1
CF;t(h)
 1

 
 1
(5)
 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and 0 <
t < 1 determines the degree of home bias. The time subscript on  is needed to
model demand (preference) shocks. Ct (h) denotes consumption of the aggregate
good (with a di¤erent home bias t ) in the foreign country.
The prices of the two nal goods, which also represent the countriesCPIs,
are given by
Pt =
h
tP
1 
H;t + (1  t)P 1 F;t
i 1
1 
(6)
P t =
h
tP
1 
F;t + (1  t )P 1 H;t
i 1
1 
Given these prices, the household (h) demands the following quantities of the
composite goods:
CdH;t(h) = t

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct(h); C
d
F;t(h) = (1  t)

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct(h) (7)
Households supply di¤erentiated labor services to all the rms in their coun-
try4 . Each household enjoys a degree of monopolistic power in setting its wage
Wt(h). The demand for household (h)s labor services can be written as5
Ldt (h) =

Wt(h)
Wt
 
Nt
M
(8)
Each household faces the following budget constraint:
Et[t;t+1Dt+1(h)] +B
d
t+1(h) + Pt(1 +  c;t)Ct(h) + PI;tIt(h) + PtTt(h) =
= (1  w;t)Wt(h)Ldt (h) +Dt(h) + (1 + it 1)Bdt (h)+
+(1  k;t)RtKt 1(h) + k;tPI;tKt 1(h) + t(h) (9)
The rst term on the left-hand side is the price of a portfolio of state-
contingent bonds traded internationally, and Dt is the payo¤ of such portfo-
lio in period t. Bdt (h) represents households demand for the riskless one-period
4The composite labor bundle used in production by any given home rm is given by
Nt(f) =M
1
1 
RM
0 Lt(h; f)
 1
 dh
 
 1
. The scaling factor M
1
1  is necessary to maintain
the aggregate relationship Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(f)df = MLt(h). Together with the expression Kt =
MKt(h) this will ensure that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale.
Additionally, in the steady state the aggregate wage W will equal the individual wage W (h).
5Similar to the price of the bundle of goods, the expressions for aggregate wage is Wt =
M
1
 1
hRM
0 Wt(h)
1 dh
i 1
1  .
6
nominal domestic government bond6 . Households receive transfers PtTt(h) from
their government.  c;t, w;t and k;t are taxes on consumption, labor income
and capital income, respectively; e¤ectively, households pay tax on nominal cap-
ital income and get an ination-adjusted rebate on depreciated capital. t(h)
represent households dividend income, and It(h) denotes investment.
The households capital accumulation is given by
Kt(h) = (1  )Kt 1(h) + It(h)  1
2
 

It(h)
Kt 1(h)
  
2
Kt 1(h) (10)
The investment good It(h) is aggregated from home and foreign bundles just
as in (5), but I allow for a di¤erent investment home bias7 .
Households maximize utility (4) subject to the budget constraint (9), labor
demand (8) and capital accumulation constraint (10) by choosing wage rate
Wt(h), consumption Ct(h), portfolio holdings Dt+1(h) and Bdt+1(h), and invest-
ment It(h).
Wages are sticky, and in any given period a household gets to reset its wage
with probability (1  !) ((1  !) abroad). The optimal new wage satises
h
~Wt
i+1
=

  1
Et
P1
j=t(!)
j t

W
(+1)
j

Nj
M
1+
Et
P1
j=t(!)
j t
n
j(1  w;j)Wj NjM
o
Similar to the derivations of the aggregate price level given rmsrst-order
conditions, the aggregate wage level is given by
W 1 t = (1  !) ~W 1 t + !W 1 t 1
The rest of the rst order conditions are fairly standard. International risk-
sharing conditions and householdsrst order conditions imply that
qt =  
Ct (h)(1 +  c;t)
Ct (h)(1 + c;t)
, (11)
where qt  P

t
Pt
is the relative CPI index (price of foreign consumption bundle
in terms of home consumption bundle, not equal to one due to the presence of
the home bias in the two countries) and constant   is determined by the initial
consumption conditions at home and abroad8 .
6 In the presence of the complete set of Arrow securities Dt, government bonds are redun-
dant for the purposes of risk-sharing; I introduce them to model the dynamics of national
debt.
7 IH;t(h) (and later GH;t) has the same composition with respect to the di¤erentiated
intermediate home goods as YH;t in (1). Similarly, IF;t(h) and GF;t have the same composition
with respect to intermediate foreign goods as YF;t in (1). Notice, however, that the degree
of home bias in investment (#t) may be di¤erent from consumption home bias (t) and
government home bias (t); the latter is dened below. Consequently, the price of investment
PI;t may be di¤erent from the price of consumption Pt.
8While the existence of the internationally traded bond simplies aggregation by equalizing
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2.3 The Government
The instrument of the common monetary authority is the short-term nominal
interest rate it. The conduct of monetary policy has important implications for
national scal governments because the value of the interest rate a¤ects interest
payments on national debt. In addition, price and wage stickiness o¤er a channel
for monetary policy to a¤ect real activity in both economies.
The monetary authority sets the interest rate in response to the aggregate
monetary union ination t:
it = (1  i)i+ iit 1 +$(1  i)t + "i;t (12)
t = H;t + 
F;t
Here i =   log() is the steady state level of the interest rate.   MM+M and
  MM+M measure the relative size of the two regions, and $ indicates the
relative weight on ination targeting9 .
I chose to exclude the output gap from the Taylor rule for several reasons.
First, "The primary objective of the ECBs monetary policy is to maintain
price stability. The ECB aims at ination rates of below, but close to, 2% over
the medium term."10 Moreover, the existing empirical literature does not seem
to agree on the value of the coe¢ cient on the gap term: estimates (based on
monthly data) range from statistically insignicant to 1.03.11 . Finally, the focus
of this paper is on the di¤erences of welfare costs among countries of di¤erent
size, rather than on the costs themselves (the latter clearly would be strongly
inuenced by the value of the gap term coe¢ cient), or on the choice of optimal
monetary policy. I perform a robustness check (results available upon request)
by adding the output gap term to the monetary policy rule, and the main
conclusion of the paper does not change: nominal costs of inertia are almost
identical in small and large members of the monetary union.
The home country scal authority has the following budget constraint (ex-
pressed in per capita terms):
Bst+1 +  c;tPtCt + w;tWtNt + k;tKt 1(Rt   PI;t) =
= (1 + it 1)Bst + PG;tGt=M + PtTt
Here Gt denotes aggregate government purchases, which may have a di¤erent
home bias (and therefore a di¤erent price) than the consumption or investment
marginal utilities of wealth in the two countries, it has an uncomfortable implication that the
variation in the relative consumption growth rates is directly linked to the volatility of the
ination dispersion. To see this, divide (11) by its lag to get Ct
Ct 1
Ct 1
Ct
= [
Pt
Pt 1
Pt 1
Pt
]  =
[
F;t
H;t
] . In the data, the correlation between these two variables is rather low [see, for
example, Chari et al (2002)].
9This specication of the monetary policy is the model-consistent representation of the
actual ECB weighted measure of aggregate ination.
10http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html
11A non-exhaustive list of such studies includes Andrés, López-Salido and Vallés (2006),
Hayo and Hofman (forthcoming), Gerlach-Kristen (2003), and Gerdesmeier and Ro¢ a (2004).
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goods. Analogous equations (with starred variables) describe the scal policy
in the foreign country.
Each government has ve tools at its disposal to a¤ect the functioning of
its domestic economy: three taxes, transfers, and purchases. In this model,
government purchases are described by an autoregressive process as follows:
logGt = (1  g) logG+ g logGt 1 + "g;t
Taxes are assumed to be constant12 ; transfers react to the debt-to-GDP ratio
to ensure long-run scal solvency:
log Tt = (1  tr) log T + tr log Tt 1 + b(logB   logBt 1)
In the above equations, bars denote steady state variables; shocks to government
variables are uncorrelated white noise processes.
2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Since the measure of households in the two countries is not one, aggregate and
per-capita quantities will be di¤erent in equilibrium: aggregate consumption
is a multiple of the per-capita value: Ct = MCt(h). Similar expressions link
aggregate and per-capita investment and capital.
Given the above expressions for the aggregate price and wage levels, the
aggregate output can be rewritten in terms of aggregate capital stock Kt 1 R 1
0
Kt 1(f)df and the economy-wide labor input Nt 
R 1
0
Nt(f)df :
YH;t = ZtK

t 1N
1 
t DP
 1
t
DPt =
Z 1
0

PH;t(f)
PH;t
 
df = (1  )
"
PH;tePH;t
#
+ 

PH;t
PH;t 1

DPt 1;
where the last term is a measure of the aggregate price dispersion in the economy.
Equilibrium in the economy is dened by the market clearing conditions and
the rst order conditions of the agents, given the form of monetary and scal
policy rules described above.
2.5 Incomplete Asset Markets
The assumption of complete markets is not innocuous in that it tightly links
volatility of consumption to ination uctuations and through these to the inter-
est rate movements (see equation (11)). Such high correlations are not observed
in the data. Additionally, if households do not have access to contingent securi-
ties markets, their welfare losses from market frictions may be higher. For these
12The presence of non-zero distortionary taxes helps to bring the dynamics of the model
closer to the empirical data and to compare welfare results with existing literature. The
simulations presented below have been replicated with all tax rates set to zero, which did not
change the qualitative results of this paper.
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reasons, I reproduce the welfare calculations in the incomplete asset markets
setting.
The modeling of incomplete markets is borrowed from Benigno (2001) and
Andrés et al (2006). Households can allocate their wealth between domestically
traded state-contingent claims (Dt in the home country, Dt in the foreign coun-
try) and domestic government bonds, denoted by Bdt in the home country and
Bdt abroad.
Additionally, all households can buy an internationally traded one period
risk-free bond At with the gross nominal rate of return 1 + it. However, home
and foreign consumers pay di¤erent prices for this bond: foreign households pay
the usual price (1 + it) 1, while home consumersprice [1 + it   p (eat   1)] 1
depends on their position in the international asset market. Here at  AtPtCt is
the ratio of the aggregate asset holdings by home consumers to their consump-
tion, and the parameter p captures transaction costs13 . As lenders, domestic
households pay a higher price for the bond, and as borrowers they must o¤er
a rate of return higher than (1 + it). Thus, markets are complete within each
country, but consumers cannot perfectly share risk internationally.
This specication breaks down the consumption-ination relationship in
(11). Now, following a shock that reduces real income in the home country,
home consumers must borrow in the international markets to maintain their
consumption level; however, the increasing cost of borrowing will drive a wedge
between home and foreign marginal utilities of consumption and thus potentially
increase the costs of nominal inertia in small countries.
More specically, the representative home consumers budget constraint be-
comes
Et[t;t+1Dt+1(h)] +B
d
t+1(h) +At+1(h) + Pt(1 +  c;t)Ct(h) + PI;tIt(h) + PtTt(h) =
= (1  w;t)Wt(h)Ldt (h) +Dt(h) + (1 + it 1)Bdt (h) + [1 + it 1   p (eat   1)]At(h)+
+(1  k;t)RtKt 1(h) + k;tPI;tKt 1(h) + t(h)
2.6 National Welfare Measure
A natural (and commonly used) measure of the national welfare is the aggregate
utility of all the domestic households. Letting the aggregate disutility of work
be denoted as ALj14 , the value function that measures national welfare can be
written as
Vt = maxEt
1X
j=t
j t
(
MC1 j
1   
1
1 + 
ALj
)
13Equilibrium dynamics of a small open economy with incomplete asset markets generally
include a random walk component; the transaction cost modication guarantees stationary of
the model. See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for explicit treatment of the problem.
14ALj =

Nj
M
1+
DWj , where DWj = (1   !)M

~Wj
Wj
 (1+)
+
!

Wj 1
Wj
 (1+)
DWj 1 and Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(f)df .
10
This value function will be used to make quantiable comparisons of consumer
welfare across di¤erent specications of the two economies. To see how this
can be done, let ~Vt correspond to some benchmark specication of the domestic
economy (for example, with no wage or price rigidities, so  = ! = 0) and let Vt
be the value function from a di¤erent specication (to follow the above example,
let  = ! = 0:5). Denote by ~Ct and Ct household consumption, and by fALt and
ALt aggregate labor e¤ort in these two economies, respectively. Finally, let  be
a number such that consumers are indi¤erent between receiving consumption
streams ~Cj and (1 + )Cj for all j 2 (t;1):
~Vt = Et
1X
j=t
j t
(
M ~C1 j
1   
1
1 + 
fALj) = (13)
= Et
1X
j=t
j t
(
M ((1 + )Cj)
1 
1   
1
1 + 
ALj
)
The two value functions are equalized by adjusting only the stream of con-
sumption, holding labor e¤orts unchanged. Therefore,  can be interpreted as
the fraction of consumption each household is willing to give up in order to move
to the benchmark economy, keeping its labor supply stream xed.
In the case of log utility, the expression for  simplies to the di¤erence
between the two value functions:
 = Vt   ~Vt (14)
Notice that in general country size enters explicitly in the expression for the
welfare function. Clearly, national welfare of a large country is greater than
that of a small country, which makes it di¢ cult to make comparisons between
two asymmetric members of the currency union. However, for the purposes of
quantifying the welfare e¤ects of country size, I will keep the size of the home
country constant at one (M = 1) while increasing the size of the foreign country
(M > 1). If no other parameters of the model change, then (14) can be used
to study the welfare of the home country as it becomes progressively smaller
relative to the foreign country.
3 Calibration
This paper considers three di¤erent calibration schemes. As a benchmark case,
I assume that both economies are symmetric with measure one of households in
each country, since this will allow for easy comparisons of the results with the
existing studies. In the other two specications, the size of the foreign country
is increased to M = 4 and then to M = 19, so that the home country makes
up 20 and 5 percent of the union, respectively (corresponding to France and the
Netherlands, for example).
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Parameter Description Value
 Relative risk aversion 1.0
 Inverse of Frisch labor elasticity 3.0
 Consumption home bias (domestic good) 0.75
 Discount factor 0.99
 Elasticity of substitution between 1.5
home and foreign goods
 Capital share in the production function 0.33
A Matrix of technology coe¢ cients

0:83 0:39
0:03 0:72

 Capital depreciation rate 0.025
 Investment adjustment cost 8.0
 Elasticity of substitution between 8.0
goods varieties
 Elasticity of substitution between labor varieties 7.0
 Price stickiness 0.67
! Wage stickiness 0.80
 c Consumption tax 0.17
w Labor income tax 0.36
k Tax on capital (net of depreciation) 0.39
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
3.1 Production and Preferences
Each time period in the model corresponds to one quarter. I follow Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2004a) and Pappa (2004) in setting most of the parameters of
the model; Table 1 summarizes their values. Many of these values are common
in the literature on the European currency union; a few other parameters merit
further description.
Empirical estimates put the value of Frisch labor elasticity anywhere between
0.05 and 0.35. It has been noted by Canzoneri et al (2007), among others, that
welfare costs are very sensitive to this parameter; therefore, I chose a conser-
vative value  1 = 0:33 as the benchmark; robustness checks (not reported)
indicate that this parameter has no impact on the di¤erences in welfare costs of
large and small countries.
The home bias parameter is set at  =  = 0:75, which serves as a good
lower bound on the share of imports in consumption in the EMU. I allow in-
vestors to have lower biases for the domestically produced good: # = # = 0:5;
nally, since governments consume mostly domestic goods,  =  = 0:9.
As the relative size of the home country decreases, its share of imports
still remains the same: (1   ) = 0:25. However, foreign home bias  is
adjusted upward, which means that imports constitute a smaller share of foreign
consumption. For example, when M = 4,  = 0:94. In the absence of this
adjustment, foreign country would demand a disproportionately large share of
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home country output, which would raise home employment and wages and make
it di¢ cult to compare home welfare across the three relative size specications.
Capital adjustment costs are calibrated so that the relative volatility of in-
vestment in the model is consistent with that in the data.
The cost of participating in the international asset markets, p, is set to 10 3
following Benigno (2001). This value implies a spread of 10 basis points between
home and foreign yields, which is in line with recent empirical observations: Lane
(2006) reports that the spread across national 10-year government bond yields
in the EMU was 30 basis points in June of 2005.
The productivity process was approximated as a quasi-Solow residual, hold-
ing capital stock constant (a reasonable assumption for the estimation of short-
run correlations): ln(Zt) = ln(Yt)  (1  ) ln(Nt). I estimated several bivariate
VARs of individual country productivities and the aggregate EMU productiv-
ity Zt (calculated using the aggregate EMU real output and employment)
15 .
Thus, the foreign productivity shock "z in our model can be interpreted as
the average technological improvement in the rest of the EMU vis-à-vis the
home country. Variances of these shocks were estimated to lie in the follow-
ing ranges: V ar("z) 2 [0:000021; 0:000128] with Portugal exhibiting the high-
est variance of productivity; V ar("z) 2 0:000015 for the Euro aggregate; and
Cov("z; "

z) 2 [0:000008; 0:000056]. In the simulations, V ar("z) and Cov("z; "z)
are set to their lowest estimated values, so that the calculated costs of nominal
inertia can be interpreted as the lower bounds for the true costs.
Finally, wage stickiness parameter ! has been set to 0:80 (which is slightly
higher than the commonly used value of 0:75) to bring wage volatility in range
of the data.
3.2 Government Policies
Fiscal policy was estimated using data from Finland, France, Ireland and the
Netherlands; the choice of countries is based on the availability of scal data.
The ratio of government debt to GDP has to be stationary in the model;
scal policy, therefore, must respond in some way to either decit or debt. The
reactions of government spending and (separately) transfers to the debt-to-GDP
ratio are estimated to be signicant in all four countries; responses of both vari-
ables to the decit ratio are much smaller and not statistically signicant in two
of the four cases. (Estimation results are presented in Appendix B.) Therefore,
in the model transfers respond to the deviation of debt ratio from its steady-
state value. The latter is set at 60 percent of GDP in both economies, which
corresponds to the Maastricht debt criterion and is roughly representative of
the above four countries during the 1999-2004 period. This model does not cap-
ture all sources of revenues and outlays available to the European governments,
and so cannot match all features of the observed scal policies. To achieve the
60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, transfers are set equal to 10 percent of GDP
15Estimations presented below were carried out using 1980-2004 quarterly data; see appen-
dix A for data description and sources.
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(compared with the EMU average of 17 percent). Of all the scal instruments,
transfers play the least distortionary role in the model (they act as a lump-sum
tax on consumers), and so adjusting their value has minimum impact on other
variables.Tax rates in Table 1 represent the average of the corresponding values
in the eleven EMU countries (Luxembourg not reported) during 1990-200016 .
The parameters of the government policy functions are estimated to be as
follows: g = tr = 0:9 and V ar("g) = 0:0082. Responsiveness of transfers
to the level of debt b was set to 0.18 in order to satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn
conditions.
The estimates of the Taylor rule parameters in equation (12) are i = 0:95,
$ = 1:4 and V ar("i) = 10 6 using the data from ten EMU countries. These
ndings are consistent with the existing literature: Duarte and Wolman (2002)
use i = 0:91 and $ = 1:31. Coenen and Straub (2005) report i to be as high
as 0:96 using Bayesian estimation methods.
3.3 Demand Shocks
It has been noted (see, for example, Canzoneri et al (2006)) that the standard
NNS models are unable to match the observed positive correlation between
output and ination because they do not properly capture aggregate demand
shocks. For this reason, I introduce a disturbance to consumer preferences when
studying the incomplete asset market setting17 . By assumption, a positive shock
increases demand in both countries for Home good (YH) by inuencing the home
bias coe¢ cients:
t =  exp(%t); 

t = 
= exp(%t)
%t = 0:9%t 1 + "%;t
This particular form of the shock is meant to capture shifts in consumer pref-
erences that can result from deeper trade integration; for example, more com-
petition between countries increases elasticity of demand for local goods18 .
The same adjustment is made to the investment and government spending
home biases. I set E (%) = 0 and V ar ("%) = 0:01. Since this shock cannot be
measured empirically, its volatility was chosen to match the standard deviation
of output in the model and in (the mid-range of) the data.
The model was solved numerically using Dynare (see Collard and Juillard
(2003)). First order approximations were used to compute moments, variance
decompositions and impulse response functions presented below; value functions
were calculated using second-order approximations to the model.
16Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002).
17With complete asset markets, preference shocks cause wealth transfers between the two
countries and so have no impact on relative consumption streams.
18A similar shock structure has been explored in Stockman and Tesar (1995).
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4 Simulation Results
This section discusses the di¤erences in welfare costs predicted by the model
for di¤erent country sizes, as well as the sensitivity of these predictions to al-
ternative specication of international asset market structure and monetary
policy setup. I calculate the responses of prices to each shock and elucidate the
cross-country linkages that help small member states to mitigate the e¤ects of
economic disturbances originating in bigger countries.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the choice and calibration of
shocks in the model will have rst-order e¤ects on welfare numbers and con-
sequently on policy suggestions. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) point
out that many New Keynesian DSGE models su¤er from presence of what the
authors call "dubiously structural" shocks, which are not derived from easily
interpretable primitives and therefore may give rise to conicting policy pre-
scriptions. For this reason, I include only three arguably non-controversial and
easily measurable shocks in the benchmark specication of the model: technol-
ogy, interest rate and government purchases. Following this, a non-observable
demand shock will be studied as a matter of model robustness.
4.1 Matching the Data
All specications of the model result in the following decomposition of steady
state GDP (in both countries): consumption share of 63%, investment share of
17% and government spending share of 20%; the corresponding EMU averages
for the period 2002-2006 are 57%, 21% and 20% (source: Eurostat).
Table 2 shows that the model approximates the volatility of the actual data19
reasonably well, except in the case of employment, which is almost twice as
volatile in the model as it is in the data. Adjusting the value of the Frisch labor
elasticity (between 0.05 and 0.35, the empirically estimated range) produces
virtually no e¤ect on the standard deviation of employment.
On the correlations front, the most noticeable inconsistencies arise with re-
spect to ination and interest rate. As mentioned above, the sign of output-
ination and output-interest rate correlations has been a rather controversial
issue in New-Keynesian models.20 Both correlations are positive in the data;
this model, however, is incapable of correctly matching the output-interest rate
correlation, and overshoots the size of output-ination correlation.
A standard one-sector New-Keynesian model predicts that a positive supply
shock creates an increase in output and a drop in price level; interest rates then
move down in response to lower ination (countercyclical movement). Demand
shocks, on the other hand, put an upward pressure on output, prices and interest
rates and create procyclical movements in these variables. Finally, a monetary
policy shock causes a reduction in output and ination; it is another source of
19The ranges presented in the table refer to the dispersion of corresponding moments across
Finland, France, Ireland and Netherlands (countries for which all relevant data are available).
20See Canzoneri et al (2006) for a detailed study of the signs of these correlations in New-
Keynesian models.
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Standard Deviations Correlation w/Output
Actual Data  = 12  =
1
5  =
1
20 Actual Data  =
1
2  =
1
5  =
1
20
YH 0.010-0.028 0.022 0.022 0.022 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
CH 0.014-0.029 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.507-0.820 0.991 0.991 0.991
IH 0.035-0.078 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.570-0.907 0.989 0.990 0.990
NH 0.006-0.019 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.424-0.824 0.944 0.943 0.943
WH 0.006-0.016 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.197-0.765 -0.354 -0.360 -0.363
H 0.003-0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.015-0.264 0.737 0.743 0.747
i 0.002-0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.054-0.460 -0.990 -0.983 -0.978
Table 2: Kappa is the relative size of the home economy. Moments of the
actual and simulated data under benchmark calibration (complete markets, no
preference shocks).
countercyclical movement of the interest rate. The sign and magnitude of the
resulting correlations between output, ination and the interest rate, therefore,
depend on the relative importance of the three types of shocks.
Historically, New-Keynesian models have been unable to properly capture
demand-side shocks; it is also true of this model. Variance decompositions,
presented in the next subsection, show that government (demand) shocks have
a relatively insignicant impact on the key variables of the model; the latter
are driven primarily by monetary policy disturbances and (to a lesser extent)
by technological shocks.
Monetary policy is given additional importance by the omission of the output
gap term; this form of Taylor rule creates a strong negative correlation between
interest rate and output. This issue will be addressed again below when I
present the variance decompositions of several key variables following the shocks
modeled in the paper.
4.2 Welfare Implications
Having described the specications and workings of the model, the rst question
to be answered is: what are the resulting costs of nominal (wage and price)
inertia, and do they depend on the country size?
Canzoneri et al (2004a) have studied the interactions of twelve separate
scal policies and the common monetary rule in the EMU. They found that
large EMU member states are better o¤ than smaller ones because ination
rates in the former are more highly correlated with the aggregate Euro area
ination to which the ECB reacts. Since prices, wages and scal policy cannot
move instantly to counteract country-specic shocks, the EMU members rely
on the central bank policy to o¤set their high-frequency economic disturbances.
However, a German ination shock would elicit a stronger interest rate response
than a similar shock in Belgium, resulting in relatively high welfare costs of
nominal rigidities in the latter country. The authors calculate that the welfare
costs of business cycles can be up to four times higher in an "average-size" EMU
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country than in a "large" one.
There are two reasons why the above ndings may exaggerate welfare losses
of the small EMU countries. First, the authors present a partial-equilibrium
model, which potentially ignores cross-country links that can o¤set idiosyncratic
shocks even before the ECB steps in. Indeed, as will be shown below, there exists
a strong positive correlation between home and foreign inations that causes
the central bank to respond to home country shocks even when the country is
very small. Second, if technological innovations are positively correlated across
member states (as is the case in the OECD data), then, as in the previous
example, German shock would spill over into Belgium almost instantaneously,
and the resulting central bank response would be helpful to both countries.
Duarte and Wolman (2002) consider a two-country DSGE model in order
to explain the observed ination di¤erentials in the EMU and their possible
dependence on country size. The authors nd that smaller countries experience
higher volatility of ination following a shock to productivity. The authors do
not calculate the resulting welfare costs of nominal rigidities, but at least within
my framework, their results would imply bigger losses for small EMU member
states: the same arguments used in the preceding paragraphs would suggest
that the response of the ECB would be skewed towards larger countries.
In this paper, ination volatility is uncorrelated with country size (this result
is discussed further below). The reason is that the model lacks two potential
sources of ination variability which are present in Duarte and Wolman (2002):
non-traded goods sectors (which allow for the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect) and
segmented markets for traded goods (with the potential failure of the Law of
One Price). I dispense with these features for two reasons: rst, Altissimo et
al. (2005) note that the standard two country models cannot properly capture
the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect because they dont possess many necessary features
(such as international capital mobility and homogeneous traded goods markets).
The authors also note that the magnitude of the terms-of-trade e¤ect usually
overshadows the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect. Secondly, Duarte and Wolman nd
that their model does not generate signicant deviations from the LoOP and
that it overestimates the volatility of ination gaps across countries.
Benchmark Counterfactual I II III IV
 = 0:5 1.81 1.79 1.97 1.66 2.03 1.94
 = 0:2 1.80 1.79 2.00 1.64 2.09 1.95
 = 0:05 1.80 1.80 2.02 1.64 2.13 1.96
Table 3: Welfare costs of nominal intertia, percent of consumption. I: incomplete
asset markets and demand shocks; II: independent monetary policies with in-
complete markets; III: (II) with imports/exports elasticity of substitution equal
to 0.9; III: benchmark with imports share equal to 40 percent.
Lets now turn to the main results. Figure 2 presents the relationship be-
tween the relative size of the Home country ( MM+M ) and its welfare cost of
nominal rigidities. Calculations, reported in Table 3, show that when asset
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Figure 2: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities as a function of relative country
size.
markets are complete, welfare costs are virtually independent of country size
(smaller countries are better o¤ by 0.01 percent of steady state consumption).
Variance decompositions for the benchmark calibration, reported in Table 4,
shed some light on this rather surprising result.
The measure of welfare in (13) is computed using the expected streams of
consumption and work hours. As was mentioned above, complete international
risk sharing equates marginal utilities (and, in this model, levels) of per-capita
consumption across the two countries at all times, and so serves as a bu¤er
against idiosyncratic shocks. Additionally, as can be seen from Table 4, volatili-
ties of consumption and hours are inuenced mostly by the interest rate, which,
being common to both countries, elicits identical responses of consumption and
hours at home and abroad (see Figure 3). Consequently, the monetary policy
shock does not favor the larger country and does not cause dispersion in welfare
costs.
The interest rate shock plays the dominant role in this model; this result
is qualitatively consistent with most two-country New-Keynesian models, al-
though the numbers reported in Table 4 are somewhat higher than usual. This
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= 12 =
1
5 =
1
20
"z+"

z "i "g+"

g "z+"

z "i "g+"

g "z+"

z "i "g+"

g
CH 8.4 91.5 0.1 7.3 92.6 0.1 6.8 93.1 0.1
NH 1.3 98.0 0.6 1.6 97.7 0.7 1.8 97.5 0.7
WH 49.8 49.9 0.2 51.0 48.8 0.2 51.6 48.2 0.3
H 19.5 80.2 0.3 20.7 79.0 0.3 21.3 78.4 0.3
i 5.0 94.9 0.1 3.0 96.9 0.1 2.3 97.5 0.2
Table 4: Variance decomposition for the benchmark calibration with nominal
rigidities, innite horizon (percent). Percentages in the table may not add up
to 100 due to rounding errors.
is partly due to the fact that my estimations indicate higher persistence in the
ECB Taylor Rule, and lower AR(1) coe¢ cients for the productivity processes
than what is reported in, for example, Canzoneri et al (2004a). If I drop the
parameters in the Taylor Rule to the U.S. levels, the resulting variance decompo-
sitions fall in line with existing literature without a¤ecting the main conclusions
of this paper.
4.3 The Feedback Channel
The case of technological shocks is a more interesting one because it highlights
the feedback channel between the two economies that magnies the interest
rate response to the small countrys ination. In what follows, I will consider
the middle-of-the-road "20-80" case, since it is applicable to the largest EMU
countries (Germany, France and Italy); however, the same arguments hold for
the other two specications.
At rst glance, the sequence of events should be as follows: when the (small)
home country is hit with a positive productivity shock, the price of its prod-
uct declines, causing domestic deation. The consequent wealth e¤ect increases
demand for home and foreign goods in both countries. As a result, the for-
eign producers e¤ectively experience an increase in demand and raise prices in
response. The weighted area-wide deation will be smaller than in the home
country; if the latter is very small, the area-wide consumer price index may even
increase, prompting an upended (from the perspective of the home country) re-
sponse from the central bank. Thus, it would seem that small countries would
not get any help from the ECB following a domestic productivity disturbance.
Upon more careful examination, however, it turns out that the foreign coun-
try also experiences deation, and consequently the interest rate unambiguously
declines (Figure 4). To see this, it is helpful to consider what happens to the
two PPI inations. The Philips curve for the home country (derived by log-
linearizing equations (2) and (3)) takes the form
H;t =
(1  )(1  )

MCt
PH;t
+ EtH;t+1;
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions of several key variables following a shock
to the interest rate in the "20-80" scenario (with complete markets).
where H;t refers to the home countrys PPI ination at date t; an analogous
equation holds for the foreign country. In other words, todays PPI ination
depends on the discounted expectations of future real marginal costs. Because
of the technological spillovers between the two countries, a positive productivity
shock in the home country almost immediately translates into higher productiv-
ity abroad, which reduces the foreign marginal cost. Moreover, price and wage
stickiness both slow down the rise in foreign factor prices, which would normally
follow an increase in demand for the foreign good. Together, these forces make
the present value of foreign future marginal costs negative, resulting in the for-
eign PPI deation (Figure 5). Consequently, both CPIs, which are weighted
averages of the two PPIs, also fall and therefore cause the central bank to lower
the interest rate.
The same argument holds in the other direction: productivity shocks origi-
nating abroad very quickly a¤ect home technology, causing the two CPI ina-
tions to move together and consequently prompting an appropriate (for both
countries) response from the central bank.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions of several key variables following a shock
to home productivity in the "20-80" scenario (with complete markets).
Simulation of the counterfactual (setting to zero the correlation of produc-
tivity shocks and the o¤-diagonal elements of technology matrix A) conrms
this result for all studied specications of the model, including the robustness
exercises discussed below: welfare costs of small countries fall below those of
large countries (the di¤erence again is very small, less than 0.01 percent of con-
sumption). Table 3 presents the results of the counterfactual simulation for the
benchmark calibration.
However, a word of caution is in order: the model overstates the impor-
tance of technology in smoothing ination di¤erentials. Canzoneri et al. (2006)
estimate the correlation between EMU-wide and individual countriesinations:
eurot = ii;t + "

i;t:
The authors nd that this correlation is much larger for countries like France
and Germany (i = 0:7) than for small EMU members like Ireland and Portugal
(i = 0:2). In contrast to this, calculations based on my model simulations
indicate that i does not fall below 0:9 even when the country is only 5 percent
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions of marginal costs and PPI inations fol-
lowing a shock to home productivity in the "20-80" scenario (with complete
markets).
of the size of the union. Insofar as my estimates of correlations in technological
processes di¤er from the above study, I should in fact nd higher correlations
between national and euro-wide inations. However, if the model is failing to
capture some country-specic shocks that are present in the data, the reported
estimates of the di¤erences in welfare costs should be interpreted as the lower
bounds for their true values.
Productivity typically plays a dominant role in NNS models; as mentioned
above, attempts to beef up the demand shocks havent been entirely satisfac-
tory. It is then entirely plausible that the standard New-Keynesian models are
incapable of properly capturing di¤erences in welfare costs of di¤erent countries.
Further research in this direction is needed to shed more light on the inuence
of relative country size on welfare costs in a monetary union.
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4.4 Demand Shocks
Lets now turn to a more realistic scenario of incomplete international asset
markets. The moments and variance decompositions of all variables are identical
to the ones reported above.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions of several key variables following an in-
crease in international demand for the home good in the "20-80" incomplete
markets scenario.
Following the addition of the demand shock (illustrated in Figure 6), smaller
countries do incur higher welfare costs, but the di¤erence in these costs across
the studied country sizes is negligible at 0:05 percent of consumption. The
resulting increase in home output gradually disappears over the period of 20
quarters. An increase in home ination more than o¤sets a (ten times smaller)
decline in the foreign price level, prompting the central bank to increase the
interest rate. Even though the monetary authority does respond to the dis-
turbance in the home economy, the additional uctuations in consumption and
hours caused by demand shocks (and reported in Table 5) coupled with non-zero
costs of lending and borrowing in international markets add almost 0.2 percent-
age points to welfare costs of home residents, compared with the benchmark
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setup.
"20-80"
"z + "

z "i "p "g + "

g
CH 10.4 87.7 1.7 0.2
NH 1.1 79.3 19.1 0.5
WH 48.2 46.7 4.9 0.2
H 17.6 74.2 7.9 0.3
i 2.9 97.0 0.0 0.1
Table 5: Variance decomposition for the "20-80" scenario when asset markets
are incomplete, innite horizon (percent). Percentages in the table may not add
up to 100 due to rounding errors.
These results are in line with the ndings of Benigno (2001): he reports
that incomplete markets cost between 0.07 and 0.7 percent of consumption. As
Column I of Table 3 indicates, the costs of going from complete to incomplete
markets do not exceed 0.2 percent of consumption for large or small countries.
How does technology play into these numbers? Following the same counter-
factual simulation as above (removing correlations in the productivity processes
and innovations), I nd that the welfare gap between small and large countries
increases (to the detriment of the former) by another 0.01 percent of steady
state consumption, a magnitude identical to the results reported in the previ-
ous section.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Independent Monetary Policies
In the aftermath of the credit crisis that had swept through most of the world
in 2008, several EMU members as well as some economists have been publicly
discussing the option of quitting the Euro area to better stabilize their economies
by regaining their own monetary policy.
In the context of the model, the results of Section 4.4 do indeed suggest that
small countries incur higher (albeit very marginally) costs of nominal rigidities.
How would the relationship between these costs and country size change if the
two economies could pursue independent monetary policies?
To answer this question, I modify the structure of the model by introducing
a nominal exchange rate between the two countries and a second policy rule
that governs the foreign interest rate it . More specically, each of the two
central banks follows the rule given by (12), with the same calibration as in the
benchmark specication. Asset markets are again incomplete, with domestic
residents paying a premium (which depends on their international portfolio)
over the foreign rate it .
Column II of Table 3 and Figure 2 present the results of this exercise. Ceteris
paribus, smaller countries fare slightly better than large ones when each country
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has its own monetary policy. It is tempting to interpret these results as suggest-
ing that the EMU countries give up close to 0.4 percent of consumption to be
a part of the union. However, this study focuses on welfare di¤erences between
countries of di¤erent sizes under various scenarios rather than on which scenario
delivers the lowest costs. The absolute value of the costs depends not only on
the structure of the model, but also on the parameterization; the question of
net total benets of a monetary union is beyond the scope of this paper.
Based on the results of this section, one can conclude that, whatever the pros
and cons of independent monetary policy may be, the costs of nominal rigidities
are virtually independent of country size both in and out of a currency union.
5.2 Parameter Values
Researchers working with DSGE models in international setting have pointed
out that model predictions and the corresponding policy prescriptions can be
sensitive to several parameter values. Here I check whether the results of the
above simulations would change following recalibration of two well-studied pa-
rameters: elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and the
degree of home bias.
Tille (2001) points out that transmission mechanism and welfare e¤ects of
monetary and scal policy shocks depend on the degree of substitutability be-
tween local and foreign goods, which a¤ects the ability of households to switch
between these goods following a change in the terms of trade. In the context
of the present model, terms of trade are a¤ected by shocks to demand (both
public and private) and technology. Column III of Table 3 shows the results
of the "worst case scenario" of incomplete markets subject to demand shocks
and low elasticity of imports/exports substitution. As expected, limiting the
extent of consumption-switching after a terms-of-trade change lowers welfare of
all countries, with smaller ones being a¤ected more, since imports constitute a
larger share of their consumption. However, even with this unfavorable setup,
small countries fare worse than large ones by only 0.09 percent of steady state
consumption. Switching to independent monetary policy yields results similar
to the ones reported in Column II: absolute costs fall to 1.64 percent, with the
di¤erence between large and small countries falling to 0.007 percent.
I next turn to the impact of trade openness on the di¤erences in the costs
of welfare between the two monetary union members. Figure 1 shows that the
shares of exports and imports vary signicantly across European countries. As
documented in the literature21 , the presence of home bias in the international
consumption aggregator (5) generates endogenous movements of the real ex-
change rate in response to changes in terms of trade; real exchange rate, in
turn, a¤ects relative consumptions in the two countries22 .
In column IV of Table 3, the share of imports in the home country is increased
to 40 percent while maintaining the incomplete markets and demand shocks
21See, for example, Faia and Monacelli (2008) and Mykhaylova (2009).
22 International asset markets are incomplete, so we do not get the usual link between home
and foreign consumption levels, Ct = QtCt .
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assumptions. The welfare costs decrease slightly for all country sizes and become
more similar: if a country is relatively more open to trade, its CPI ination is
more correlated with foreign ination. A reduction in ination di¤erentials
makes the job of the common monetary policy easier and increases the degree
of implicit international risk-sharing.
This works is not aiming at estimating welfare costs of price and wage inertia
per se. The robustness checks, however, show that the main nding - that
di¤erence in welfare costs across small and large EMU countries are negligent -
are independent of the modeling assumptions.
6 Conclusion
I have employed a two-country general equilibrium model of a currency union
to answer the question of how (if at all) country size a¤ects welfare costs of
nominal rigidities in the EMU member states. The main result - that there
are virtually no di¤erences in these costs between small and large countries - is
primarily driven by two features of the model.
First, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which have the potential to drive a
wedge between welfare measures of large and small countries, are mitigated by
cross-country productivity links. EMU members have experienced an increase
in the degree of alignment of their business cycles, as is reported in Lane (2006)
and as seen in the estimates of productivity processes. Insofar as productivity
shocks are among the main causes of business cycles, the model is able to explain
why welfare costs of nominal rigidities are so similar across countries of di¤erent
sizes: technology spillovers bring national output and price movements closer
in sync and so help to make the interest rate response appropriate for both
member countries.
Secondly, the model indicates that monetary policy shocks (which are sym-
metric across all union countries) account for most of the variability of output,
consumption and hours and so a¤ect welfare measures of all countries equally.
In the presence of incomplete markets and consumption demand shocks, I
nd that gains in welfare for small countries relative to large ones from retaining
independent monetary policies are very small. It seems that costs associated
with nominal rigidities fall equally on all countries studied in this paper, regard-
less of whether they are inside or outside of the monetary union.
Some caution needs to be taken when interpreting the results of this study.
As is common in New-Keynesian literature, the model does not properly cap-
ture the observed cyclical correlation between output and interest rate, and
overestimates the output-ination correlation due to the dominance of interest
rate movements. Technological shocks are likely to play a larger role in driving
output uctuations than my results suggest; if the resulting price movements
are not as responsive to GDP uctuations as the simulations show, monetary
policy may be less e¤ective in smoothing business cycles, and so welfare costs
of nominal rigidities may be higher than this paper predicts.
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A Data Sources and Description
All data are taken from OECD Economic Outlook No. 77.
Pt Harmonized consumer price index
Yt GDP at market prices, deated by the HICP
Ct Private consumption, volume, deated by the HICP
It Private xed investment (excluding stockbuilding), volume, deated by the HICP
Gt Government consumption (including wages), deated by the HICP
Tt Government transfers (the sum of Subsidies, Social benets paid by Government,
and Other current transfers paid by government), deated by the HICP
Bt Gross government debt, % of GDP
Nt Average hours per employee times the Total employment
Wt Real total compensation per employee
t Ination rate, calculated as log(
Pt
Pt 1
)
it Short-term interest rate, approximated as log(1 + it)
Decit Government net lending, % of GDP
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B Estimation
B.1 Productivity
I assume that in the short run, nation-wide capital stock is xed; this allows us
to approximate total factor productivity (TFP) as lnZt = lnYt   (1  ) lnNt.
(Details on the variable denitions can be found in Appendix A.) I use 1980:1-
2004:4 data on real output and employment to compute the TFP series for
individual EMU members (where data are available) and for the monetary union
as a whole, and then estimate VARs of the form
zt
zt

=

A11 A12
A21 A22
 
zt 1
zt 1

+

"z;t
"z;t

;
where zt is H-P ltered natural log of TFP for an individual country, and zt is
the analogous value for the EMU area. Table 6 presents our estimation results.
Clearly, there is a lot of heterogeneity in our estimates; for the simulations,
Portugal is used as the middle-of-the-road result (that is also statistically sig-
nicant).
B.2 Fiscal policy
I compute the series of H-P ltered natural logs of real government purchases
and transfers and estimate two autoregressions of the form
gt = 0 + 1gt 1 + "g;t
trt = 0 + 1trt 1 + "tr;t
The results, using data for 1980:1-2004:4, are reported in Table 7:
In the simulations, I use Irelands values, since they fall in the mid-range
of the estimates. The value of 0 is chosen so that the steady state share of
government purchases GY is equal to 20 percent; 0 is set to achieve 60 percent
debt-to-GDP ratio in the steady state.
B.3 Interest rate rule
I assume that the monetary policy of the European Central Bank can be de-
scribed by the Taylor rule of the form
it = 0 + 1it 1 + (1  1)2t + "i;t
The coe¢ cients were estimated over two di¤erent periods: 1991:3-2004:4
(during the economic convergence process) and 1999:4-2004:4 (after the intro-
duction of the Euro). The results of least squares estimations are presented in
Table 8:
In the simulations, I use the average value for the weight on ination: 2 =
1:4.
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Country A11 A12 A21 A22 2(zt) 
2(z

t ) Cov(zt; z

t )
Belgium 0.69 0.02 0.11 0.64 4.8x10 5 1.5x10 5 1.6x10 5
(6.62) (0.10) (1.93) (7.21)
Finland 0.82 0.16 0.05 0.66 1.1x10 4 1.5x10 5 1.4x10 5
(12.00) (0.74) (2.08) (8.39)
France 0.31 0.49 -0.22 0.99 2.1x10 5 1.5x10 5 1.5x10 5
(2.07) (2.99) (-1.72) (7.12)
Ireland 0.52 0.42 0.01 0.76 1.9x10 4 1.6x10 5 1.6x10 5
(5.60) (1.79) (0.56) (11.18)
Italy 0.36 0.47 -0.05 0.83 5.2x10 5 1.6x10 5 2.1x10 5
(2.84) (2.63) (-0.66) (8.46)
Luxem. 0.89 0.01 0.03 0.73 7.0x10 5 1.5x10 5 1.2x10 5
(16.28) (0.01) (1.08) (10.33)
Nether. 0.51 0.14 0.02 0.76 6.0x10 5 1.6x10 5 1.1x10 5
(5.45) (1.07) (0.39) (11.09)
Portugal 0.83 0.39 0.03 0.72 1.3x10 4 1.5x10 5 5.6x10 5
(16.00) (2.06) (1.78) (11.07)
Spain 0.37 0.07 0.00 0.77 4.4x10 5 1.6x10 5 0.8x10 5
(3.77) (0.68) (0.03) (12.07)
Table 6: Estimates of the productivity processes (t-stats in parentheses).
Country 1 1 V ar(gt)
Finland 0.80 0.92 1.7x10 4
(12.92) (26.06)
France 0.87 0.85 2.0x10 5
(17.10) (15.93)
Ireland 0.92 0.87 8.9x10 5
(21.87) (17.71)
Nether. 0.69 0.94 9.7x10 5
(9.02) (27.30)
Table 7: Estimates of the government policy processes (t-stats in parentheses).
Period 0 1 2 "
1991:3-2004:4 -0.00 0.95 1.27 1.06x10 3
(-0.27) (32.01) (1.04)
1999:1-2004:4 -0.00 0.94 1.73 1.01x10 3
(-0.28) (11.41) (1.4)
Table 8: Estimates of the Taylor Rule (t-stats in parentheses).
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